Abstract-The need for the development of a credible method and instrument for partial defect verification of spent fuel has been emphasized over a few decades in the safeguards communities as the diverted spent fuel pins can be the source of nuclear terrorism or devices. The need is increasingly more important and even urgent as many countries have started to transfer spent fuel to so called "difficult-to-access" areas such as dry storage casks, reprocessing or geological repositories. Partial defect verification is required by IAEA before spent fuel is placed into "difficult-to-access" areas. Earlier, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has reported the successful development of a new, credible partial defect verification method for pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies without use of operator data, and further reported the validation experiments using commercial spent fuel assemblies with some missing fuel pins. The method was found to be robust as the method is relatively invariant to the characteristic variations of spent fuel assemblies such as initial fuel enrichment, cooling time, and burn-up. Since then, the PDET system has been designed and prototyped for 17x17 PWR spent fuel assemblies, complete with data acquisition software and acquisition electronics. In this paper, a summary description of the PDET development followed by results of the first successful field testing using the integrated PDET system and actual spent fuel assemblies performed in a commercial spent fuel storage site, known as Central Interim Spent fuel Storage Facility (CLAB) in Sweden will be presented. In addition to partial defect detection initial studies have determined that the tool can be used to verify the operator declared average burnup of the assembly as well as intraassembly bunrup levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various attempts have been made in the past two decades to develop a technology to identify a possible diversion of pins from a spent fuel assembly and to determine whether some pins are missing or replaced with dummy or fresh fuel pins. This aspect of the verification regime is known as partial defect detection. If diverted, this nuclear material, which is nuclear weapon-usable, could be the source of nuclear terrorism. Thus securing and monitoring one of the world's possible sources of nuclear terrorism is an essential part of the international safeguards regime.
With the discharge of over 10,000 metric tons of heavy metal from global reactors, storage pools in most countries are rapidly approaching their design limits. Some countries adopted a closed fuel cycle by reprocessing spent fuel and recycling mixed oxide fuel whereas many of the countries opted for above ground interim dry storage for their spent fuel management strategy. Some countries like Finland and Sweden are already well on the way to setting up a conditioning plant and a deep geological repository for spent fuel. For all these situations, transfers of spent fuel into containers are often needed and the subject spent fuel will attain a 'difficult-to-access' status. According to the IAEA Safeguards Criteria, the nuclear material should be verified prior to its becoming difficult-to-access by item counting, item identification where feasible and nondestructive assay (NDA) for gross and partial defects. The current detection requirement by the IAEA for partial defect tests for irradiated fuel assemblies should assure that at least half of the fuel pins (50%) are present in each assembly [1] .
To date, there are no safeguards instruments that can detect partial defects of spent fuel in all conditions, although digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) [2] has been approved by IAEA for partial defect verification. However, the DCVD does not work well for fuel that has been cooled for a long time or low burnup fuel or in murky spent fuel pool conditions. It also has an issue with cases where the pins are missing in a random fashion since neighboring fuel pins of a missing one give off radiation potentially giving a false negative indication. The FORK detector system (FDET) [3] [4] [5] can characterize spent fuel assemblies using operator declared data, and has been used for verification of spent fuel assemblies which were to be placed in dry storage casks. However, the FORK detector can be applied for partial defect testing only in a limited way as the best instrument available and cannot work without the use of operator declared data and movement of the fuel assembly. Likewise, an emission computed tomography system has been used to try to detect missing pins from a spent fuel assembly (SFA) [6] . This has shown some potential for identifying possible missing pins but the capability has not yet been demonstrated, especially in an inexpensive, easy to handle setting for field applications.
This paper presents a brief discussion on the methodology and benchmarking against fuel assemblies that are intact as well those with partial defects. A description of the development of the prototype tool (Fig. 1) will be followed by details of a field test performed with it. Finally, the paper will discuss results from using the PDET measured signals to verify operator declared burnup data.
. 
II. PARTIAL DEFECT METHODOLOGY
Every PWR fuel assembly has as a design feature a set of guide tubes where a control rod assembly can be inserted (see Fig. 2 ). The control rod assembly is used to control neutron flux during reactor operation. In the discharged spent fuel assembly (SFA), the guide tubes are filled with water when stored in the spent fuel pool. The concept of partial defect verification is to use the gamma and neutron flux information inside these guide tube holes to develop signature profiles that are invariant in intact SFAs.
The gamma and neutron signals are obtained by inserting tiny neutron and gamma detectors into the guide tubes of a SFA. The guide tubes form a quadrant symmetric pattern in the various PWR fuel product lines and the neutron and gamma signals from these various locations are processed to obtain a unique signature for an undisturbed fuel assembly, defined as the base signature. The base signatures can be formed from gamma signals, neutron signals or gamma to neutron ratio. The base signature is the arrangement of the signals at each of the guide tube locations normalized to the maximum among them in a particular pattern. For example, for a 14 x 14 PWR SFA, there are 16 guide tubes, and thus 16 measurement positions or 16 gamma and neutron data points. A symmetric pattern or base gamma to neutron ratio signature is obtained when signals are plotted in a systematic manner starting with the guide tube location closest to the center and moving in a counter-clockwise manner for each cluster of 4 guide tubes (e.g. c, d, a, b, etc.) Figure 2 shows the alphabetic labels 'a' through 'p' for the sixteen locations. The base signatures of neutron and gamma are obtained in a similar manner. Figure 3 shows a typical base signature for the ratio when the SFA has no missing fuel pins. In the case of diversion of nuclear fuel pins, one or more of the base signatures gets distorted and the amount of distortion depends on the degree of diversion. Previous papers detailed the development of this unique signature that will be noticeably perturbed if some of the fuel pins are replaced with dummy pins both in isolated SFAs as well as SFAs in an in-situ condition in the storage racks in symmetric or random removal patterns [7] [8] [9] [10] . The methodology was validated with measurements in SFAs with excellent agreement between the experimental and simulated data. Thus a visual inspection of the signature can identify partial defects, making the verification method easy to interpret without requiring operator declared data or fuel movement [11] .
III. PROTOTYPE PDET DEVELOPMENT

A. Detectors
The detectors [12] used in the PDET are commercially available high-dose environment fission chambers and ion chambers. The fission chambers are for neutron detection and are Centronics FC4A 235 U fission chambers. These detectors are particularly efficient for thermal neutrons due to the cross section for neutrons on 235 U. The fission chambers are operated in pulse mode in which individual neutron events are detected. Fission chambers are characteristically very insensitive to gamma rays. As such, they can operate in very high gamma-ray fields and reliably respond only to the neutron flux. They require a charge sensitive preamp to collect and amplify the charge pulse. These detectors operate at a nominal voltage of 500V. The cables are 75ohm. Figure 4 shows a photograph of one Centronics FC4A fission chamber. The ion chambers are Technical Associates CP-MU-D1 ion chambers. These detectors are filled with a low pressure of gas to enable operation at gamma-ray dose rates up to 10 7 R/hr. These detectors operate in current mode and require a current sensing preamplifier. The preamplifier generates a current signal proportional to the gamma-ray flux. These detectors operate at a nominal voltage of 50V. The cables are 50ohm. Figure 5 shows a photograph of this detector. 
B. Watertight Cabling
The prototype PDET was developed for a 17 x 17 type of fuel assembly that has 24 guide tube locations. The PDET thus contains 12 fission chambers and 12 ion chambers. The PDET assembly is immersed in water during measurements, so the signals from these detectors must be routed out of the PDET to the data-acquisition system via a watertight cable [12] . For both detectors, the high-voltage and signal travel on the same coax cable. The cables from the detectors exit the stainlesssteel tubes of the PDET assembly and enter the header of the PDET. They then attach to an SHV patch panel which routes the signals to a water-tight multipin feedthrough, as shown in Figure 6 . As shown in Figure 7 , one end of a 15m underwater cable connects to this feedthrough to route the detector connections out of the spent-fuel assembly and to the data-acquisition system. The underwater bundle cable contains 12 RG179 75ohm coax cables for the fission chambers and 12 RG174 50ohm coax cables for the ion chambers, plus a four spares. A 60cm multipin to SHV breakout cable is built to ease connection to the data-acquisition system. 
C. Data Acquisition System
The unique detector configuration and need for a compact system suitable for field inspector use required the development of custom hardware and software. As a result, three prototype data-acquisition systems for the 24-detector array have been developed. The first system was built at LLNL using pulse processing hardware from the Ortec Fission Meter. This includes 12 charge-sensitive preamplifiers for the fission chambers, as well as two "Five-Mode Counter" multichannel counting boards. The ion chambers use a custom current-sensing preamp board designed at LLNL. The second system is a NIM-based system designed WIENER, Plein, & Baus, with high-density preamp modules built by Mesytec and Hytec Electronics. The third system is built by Technical Associates, who has also supplied the ion chambers. Figure 8 shows the LLNL developed Fission Meter (FM) based data acquisition system. 
IV. FIELD TEST OF THE PDET SYSTEM
The prototype PDET system was employed for testing at the CLAB, the central spent fuel storage facility in Sweden. The testing was performed with the collaboration of EURATOM in January 2014. The testing was performed over a period of four days. Figure 9 shows the PDET being inserted into the spent fuel assembly. Fig. 9 . PDET Testing at CLAB The system was tested with two of the data acquisition systems -FM-PDET and NIM-PDET. However, the NIM-PDET system turned out to be noisy using AC power while the FM-PDET performed better while using the battery option that is available on this system. Table I presents the details of the assemblies investigated and Figure 10 shows the arrangement of the fuel in casks. The results were good with the neutron signals and most of the gamma signals displaying signal strengths as expected. In particular, two of the gamma detectors in the system recorded non-normal signal strengths. Figures 11-13 display the signatures from one of the spent fuel assemblies tested. In each figure, the red line represents the simulated base signature with uniform pin burnup representing an ideal case. The blue line represents the measured data. Figure 11 represents the normalized neutron signature. As can be seen in this figure, the signature matches the expected base signature well. Figure 12 shows the normalized gamma signature compared to the baseline. It can be seen that there are a couple of places where there is a small mismatch. Figure 13 displays the normalized gamma to neutron ratio and some small distortions are seen where the gamma signature was misaligned.
One potential cause for the slight deviation exhibited by some of the gamma detectors could be due to fact that these North detectors were not calibrated in high enough gamma fields that they encounter inside the spent fuel. The neutron detectors were calibrated in fields that were reasonably comparable to those in the fuel. Other potential issues related to the data acquisition system are also being investigated. 
A. Methodology
The average burnup of the fuel assembly as well as the regional burnup levels within an assembly can be estimated using the neutron and gamma signals. Two independent equations can be set up relating the gamma and neutron counts to booth cooling time and burnup, thus simultaneously solving for both these properties making it rather difficult for the operator to falsify data. The gamma and neutron counts could be an average of all the guide tube locations, e.g. sixteen in the case of a 14 x 14 type of assembly or just the average of the inner four guide tube locations. The latter case was found to be adequate based on experimental data that was acquired from measurements obtained from actual spent fuel assemblies. The gamma relationship can be established by forcing the counts to zero for fresh fuel as shown below. G m represents the gamma counts, 't' represents the cooling time, Cs137 is the decay constant for 137 Cs, the principal source of gammas in spent fuel, 'bu' is the burnup, and 'a' is the slope of the linear relationship between gamma counts and burnup.
The neutron counts are a power function of burnup. In the equation relating neutron counts and burnup N m represents the neutron counts, 't' is the cooling time, Cm244 is the decay constant of the principal neutron emitter 244 Cm, 'bu' is the burnup, 'c' the constant from the curve fit, and 'd' the power that ranges between 3 and 5.
Thus, with sufficient data for both neutron and gamma calibration curves can be established and these equations can be simultaneously solved to estimate cooling time and burnup of an assembly. In this study, only gamma data was obtained from the test assemblies measured in a previous testing campaign [11] . The properties of these assemblies is shown bin Table II . As can be seen they represent a good range of burnup as well as cooling time. In this study, the cooling time based on the declared discharge date was used to back out the signal at end of irradiation. Figure 14 shows the data with the fitted equation. These were 14 x 14 assemblies and plot shows the fitted line with the equation that the cooling time corrected gamma counts are 21.56 times the burnup in units of GWd/tU.
Fig. 14. Gamma Counts versus Burnup
This data can be used not only to estimate the average burnup of the assembly but also the regional burnup within the assembly defined as the average around each guide tube. This can be done by estimating the importance of each pin in the assembly for its contribution to a particular guide tube location. MCNP [12] was used to estimate these factors. These importance functions were derived using both assemblies with uniform burnup and actual burnup maps of the assemblies in Table II . Though there were small differences between these cases, the importance functions, as expected, were not very different for a given guide tube location for the fuel pins in the vicinity of a particular guide tube, which, as expected, made the only significant contributions to signal at that guide tube. Thus a standard set of importance functions was derived for each of the sixteen guide tubes for use in estimating the burnups on a lattice average level as well as a regional level.
The average burnup of the SFA was determined by taking the average gamma signal of the 16 guide tubes and dividing by the slope. In a similar way, the measured burnup in the vicinity of a guide tube was determined by dividing the signal at that guide tube by 21.56 to obtain the local burnup. This can then be compared with the declared burnup in the vicinity of that guide tube by weighting each pin's declared burnup by its importance function that is specific to the guide tube under consideration and summing them up.
As an example the spent fuel assembly the regional burnup was estimated for the assembly denoted as C15 in Table II . This assembly had a region where a lot of fuel pins had been removed thus potentially creating a mismatch between the declared and measured burnup. Table III presents the declared and measured data and Figure 15 shows the layout of the C15 assembly with missing pins shown in red. Only a selection of guide tube location data is presented Table III shows that in the region where the assembly is intact, the declared and measured burnups match very well as does the overall assembly average burnup with 12 percent of the fuel missing in the assembly. However, in two instances where a large cluster is missing the two values are completely mismatched.
Some of the data from the field test at CLAB was used to develop a fit between gamma signal and the burnup of the assemblies. Figure 16 presents this data. The signal in Figure 16 is the average of the four inner guide tube data. The fit is reasonable given that there is an outlier as well as the fact that some of the gamma data was anomalous. Consequently, regional burnup data was not evaluated using this data pending further investigation into the issues related to the gamma signals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The partial defect tool, PDET, can provide a unique capability to check for partial defects in PWR spent fuel without the use of facility declared data and in an in-situ condition of the fuel in its storage location. The tool is sensitive to the level of detecting as low as 15% of the fuel missing far exceeding the IAEA criterion of 50%. In addition, the neutron and gamma data can be used to verify operator declared burnup and generate 2D maps of the burnups within the assembly.
The field test at CLAB was successfully concluded and provided valuable information on aspects of the tool that need some adjustments. In general both the neutron and gamma data obtained during the field test campaign were good with a few gamma detectors producing data that was not as good as expected. Recalibration of the gamma detectors in a high gamma field is being explored. Additional sites for more field testing to shake out any further problems are also being considered including at a site where fuel assemblies are available with some missing pins. A fully tested tool has the potential of solving a long standing issue of partial defect detection in the area of nuclear safeguards.
